The EU budget's mid-term review: with its promising reform proposals, the Commission lays the groundwork for the next, post-2020 budget by Becker, Peter
www.ssoar.info
The EU budget's mid-term review: with its
promising reform proposals, the Commission lays
the groundwork for the next, post-2020 budget
Becker, Peter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Becker, P. (2016). The EU budget's mid-term review: with its promising reform proposals, the Commission lays the
groundwork for the next, post-2020 budget. (SWP Comment, 48/2016). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP-
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-49426-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Dr. Peter Becker is a Semior Associate in SWP’s EU / Europe Division SWP Comments 48 
  November 2016 
1 
Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs 
 
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The EU Budget’s Mid-term Review 
With Its Promising Reform Proposals, the Commission Lays the Groundwork 
for the Next, Post-2020 Budget 
Peter Becker 
The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) lays down the amounts available 
for the EU budget over seven-year periods – currently about one billion euros for  
2014–2020 – and at the same time it sets the EU’s political priorities. The midterm 
review or rather revision offers a rare opportunity of reworking the established sums 
and adapting the MFF to new topical challenges. The Commission evidently wants to 
use this chance: on 14 September 2016, it presented an extensive package of proposals 
for reforming the MFF. This opens up the possibility of improving an unsatisfactory 
situation, in which the EU is unable to react to a changing environment or new crises 
with a policy that has a sound financial foundation, or re-orientate its budget. The 
revision also lays the groundwork for the negotiations on the new, post-2020 financial 
framework, which will begin in 2018. 
 
The EU primarily sees its budget as an in-
vestment budget for pursuing medium-
term political goals and for creating seven 
years of planning security and predictabil-
ity for its multiannual programmes. Short-
term shifts and even more so reprioritisa-
tions require unanimity and are therefore 
very difficult to achieve. 
However, the European Parliament (EP) 
had insisted during the negotiations for 
the current MFF in 2011/12 that the Com-
mission had to check and review the MFF’s 
established priorities and financial pro-
visions mid-term. According to Article 2 
of the MFF regulations, the Commission is 
obliged to implement the task this year of 
reviewing the way the MFF operates and 
to present reform recommendations. Addi-
tionally, the Commission committed itself 
to revising the MFF regulations as part of 
this mid-term review and to checking the 
MFF’s financial basis and duration. In other 
words, the Commission sought changes and 
adaptations for the second half of the MFF’s 
period that far exceed a simple mid-term 
strength/weaknesses balance sheet. Such a 
far-reaching revision offers an opportunity 
of amending the MFF and the spending pri-
orities set in the EU budget – with the pro-
viso that EU funds already allocated to the 
member states cannot be cut. The majority 
of the MFF resources will thus remain un-
changed, for the EU budget is characterised 
by the fact that 80 percent of its financial 
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resources are allocated to expenditure 
headings at the very start of the MFF’s 
term and firmly committed to the member 
states. Fixing expenditures in this way has 
the advantage that member states can pre-
dict with a very high degree of precision 
how much money to expect from Brussels 
and for which areas of spending. On the 
other hand, the migrant crisis in particular 
has shown up the disadvantages of the EU’s 
lack of flexibility in budget policy, which 
results from fixing the MFF’s spending prior-
ities and total amount for seven-year periods. 
The massive need for funding short-term 
measures could not be adequately met using 
the EU budget; a fast reaction to acute chal-
lenges and crises was almost impossible. 
The European Commission’s 
proposal 
The Commission submitted its proposals 
for the mid-term MFF revision at the same 
time and in coordination with the State 
of the Union speech of its President Jean-
Claude Juncker, on 14 September 2016. 
It suggested budgeting additional funds, 
especially for the areas of growth and 
employment, investment, and migration 
and external-border protection (see over-
view, p. 3). Overall, the spending proposed 
by the Commission for 2017–2020, the 
three remining years of the current MFF, 
amounts to 12.8 bn euros: 6.3 bn euros of 
additional funds and 6.5 bn euros either 
re-used or in de-committed appropriations. 
According to the Commission, the maxi-
mum spending ceilings agreed when the 
MFF regulations were adopted in December 
2013 will not be exceeded. Apparently, how-
ever, it intends to release existing special 
funds – such as the solidarity or globalisa-
tion funds – from the straitjacket of the MFF 
ceilings, to manage them above the MFF 
ceilings and thus create more leeway for 
payments within these limits. In all, the 
package of proposals contains a communi-
cation, an extensive explanation, four legis-
lative proposalsand a series of further pro-
posals for adapting existing regulations, 
such as those on the early prolongations 
and replenishing of the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (EFSI) and the Youth 
Employment Initiative. Some of these pro-
posals will require unanimous decision-
making, such as the amendment of the 
MFF regulation or the recommended new 
special funds, while the adjustments and 
restocking of the existing instruments will 
require approval by qualified majority 
voting, such as the increase of the Euro-
pean Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). 
The Commission intends to reach an agree-
ment on parts of the MFF-review package 
by the end of this year, such as the top-ups 
requested in an amending letter to the 
draft general budget 2017. 
In contrast to the European Parliament’s 
demands, the European Commission does 
not intend to mobilise additional sums by 
explicitly raising the ceilings of the MFF 
expenditure headings. Instead, it wants to 
use unallocated finances that would other-
wise flow back into the member states’ 
budgets. It is nonetheless unclear which 
policies are supposed to yield up these 
additional financial resources, and where 
in the EU budget the Commission discov-
ered them. It is likely that there are unallo-
cated – and therefore potentially re-usable – 
resources in those MFF headings for which 
the Commission does not intend to mobilise 
any additional monies at the mid-term 
review. This is the case with the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in heading 2 and 
administrative costs in heading 5. Sources 
in the Commission say that personnel costs 
will be almost 2 bn euros lower by 2020 than 
was forecast when the MFF was adopted. 
However, in the upcoming negotiations 
the Commission will first have to show that 
there are indeed some 4.7 bn euros of un-
allocated funds left in the CAP heading. 
The EU budget’s flexibility instruments, 
which are expected to be used in case of 
crises and new tasks, have all been used 
up halfway through the MFF’s term, leaving 
virtually no room for manoeuvre for un-
foreseen measures. The EU thus has no 
margins left at its disposal for reacting to 
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Overview 
Financial volume of mid-term MFF revision for financial years 2018–2020 
Commission mid-term review proposals for additional funding Million euros 
 (in current prices) 
Heading 1A 
“Competitiveness for growth and employment”  ........................................... 1,400 
– Horizon 2020  ...............................................................................................  400 
– “Connecting Europe” facility (transport)  ...........................................  400 
– Erasmus+ .......................................................................................................  200 
– COSME (SME funding) ...............................................................................  200 
– Prolongation of EFSI (investments)  ......................................................  150 
– WIFI4EU (digital agenda)  ............................................................................ 50 
Heading 1B 
“Cohesion for growth and employment”  ................................................... 1,000 
Youth Employment Initiative 
Heading 3 
“Union citizenship, freedom, security and justice”  ................................ 2,549 
Heading 4 
“Global Europe”  ................................................................................................... 1,385 
– Partnership framework process  .....................................................  750 
– European Fund for Sustainable Development ...........................  250 
– Macro-financial assistance  ...............................................................  270 
– External lending mandate  ...............................................................  115 
Draft annual budget 2017 – additional spending  ........................................... 1,822 
Technical adjustment of cohesion-policy envelopes  ...................................... 4,642 
Total of mid-term review package  ......................................................................  12,798 
From: European Commission; COM(2016) 603 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_de.cfm#documents. 
 
changes in its political environment. Know-
ing this, the Commission puts special em-
phasis in its proposals on new and better 
equipped flexibility instruments. It wants 
to replenish the exhausted funds and ex-
pand them, and even establish additional 
ones. 
The Commission proposes to double the 
financing of the existing flexibility instru-
ments and the Emergency Aid Reserve, and 
to remove the overall ceiling on the leeway 
for re-allocating monies. The Commission 
also proposes to create a new crisis reserve, 
to be financed by unallocated resources 
from all MFF headings. The Commission 
expects an amount of 3 to 4 bn euros per 
year. Member states experiencing an acute 
and grave crisis would be given specific 
above-average support from these reserves. 
The gap between commitment appropria-
tions and outstanding payments is increas-
ing all the time: in late 2014, it reached 
24.7 bn euros. To limit this discrepancy, the 
Commission proposes to establish a specific 
flexibility instrument for payment appro-
priations. The instrument would make it 
possible to transfer funds that will foresee-
ably not be allocated in 2017 to the 2018–
2020 annual budgets, when needs are pre-
dicted to be noticeably higher, even if this 
shift meant exceeding the MFF’s upper 
limits. 
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Negotiating the review proposals 
In the coming months, member states will 
debate the Commission’s proposal in the 
Council and then with the European Par-
liament. The Council has already created 
the necessary working structures, such as a 
Friend of the Presidency group. The Slovak 
presidency of the Council has already sub-
mitted a report on the state of play of the 
work in this working group and aims to fi-
nalise the negotiations on the amendment 
of the MFF regulation by the end of its presi-
dency. The final negotiations between 
Council and Parliament are scheduled to 
finish in mid-2017 at the latest, so that the 
proposed modifications can come into 
effect on 1 January 2018. 
Even before the Commission presented its 
proposals, a few member states had drawn 
up informal position papers and sent them 
to the Commission so as to influence its in-
ternal voting and decision-making process. 
The net contributors (Germany, France, 
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands) as 
well as the Visegrad Group sent their own 
position papers to Brussels, and the Euro-
pean Parliament also expressed its ideas in 
an early resolution. Given the positions 
adopted in the various papers and docu-
ments, negotiations look set to be difficult. 
In the EP’s initial report, adopted on 
28 June 2016, MEPs called for a significant 
raise of all the expenditure ceilings laid 
down in the MFF. They pointed out that 
additional funds were especially necessary 
for coping with the consequences of the 
migration and refugee crisis, and for pro-
longing the terms of the European youth 
initiative and the EFSI, the so-called Juncker 
funds. Fundamentally, the EP does not ex-
pect the Commission to provide only a mid-
term review of the MFF’s weaknesses and 
flaws, but to carry out a more comprehen-
sive revision, and especially to produce an 
amended MFF for the second half endowed 
with a noticeably higher expenditure vol-
ume – in other words, a de facto new MFF. 
However, the member states had made it 
clear in their position papers that this was 
precisely what they did not want and that 
they intended to hold on instead to the 
MFF’s basic principles and existing financial 
framework. They stated that if it became 
necessary to adjust the MFF for new politi-
cal challenges, it should be possible to do 
so within its fixed ceilings by re-allocating 
funds and through more efficient budget 
management. However, the member states 
will face difficulties and will have to struggle 
to identify the areas in which such savings 
and redeployments are supposed to be made. 
Any adjustment or modification of the 
MFF regulations requires the European Par-
liament’s approval and a unanimous Coun-
cil decision. If this consent is not possible, 
the MFF remains unchanged and continues 
to be valid as adopted. Because of the un-
animity requirement, member states are in 
a powerful negotiating position vis-à-vis the 
Parliament. However, MEPs can be expected 
once again to combine two budget-negotia-
tion dossiers into one overall package. In 
its proposal, the Commission has already 
established a link with the adoption of the 
2017 annual budget. In turn, this connec-
tion with the negotiations on next year’s 
budget strengthens the EP’s position in the 
MFF adjustment negotiations, since the 
member states have a strong interest in 
seeing next year’s budget passed on time. 
The Commission has found a balanced 
compromise with its proposal to provide 
about 13 bn additional euros to meet the 
challenges raised by the current crises, but 
without changing the existing MFF ceilings. 
It is unquestionably necessary to plan addi-
tional sums for tackling the refugee crisis 
and the social consequences of the economic 
crisis, and to increase the EU budget’s flexi-
bility, which will mean expanding the mar-
gins. However, net contributors will surely 
– and emphatically – raise the question in 
the Council as to where this surprisingly 
large amount of new money will come 
from, especially since they remain to be 
convinced that unused funds should stay 
in the EU budget and spent on new tasks. 
Normally, monies in the EU budget that are 
not needed for programmed projects are 
not allocated and returned to the member 
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states, that means they are set off against 
the future payments member states have 
to make to Brussels, in accordance with 
their financing obligation under the own-
resources system. 
In this context, controversial discussions 
should be expected between Council and 
EP on adjusting the MFF and re-using un-
allocated funds, or at least refraining from 
returning them. Moreover, member states 
are likely to clash in the Council on how 
to set priorities for the additional sums. 
Which task is paramount and needs addi-
tional monies most: substantially raising 
spending on the joint refugee and migra-
tion policy or on fighting youth unemploy-
ment? Can unused funds for promoting 
the CAP be used for other tasks? Or should 
European farmers, on the contrary, receive 
stronger support out of the EU budget, 
given their falling incomes and the loss of 
export markets brought about by the EU’s 
sanctions against Russia? 
The Commission, too, has secured itself 
a strong political mandate for these foresee-
able conflicts. The contents of the mid-term 
MFF revision, Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker’s speech on the state of 
the Union, and the Bratislava roadmap are 
linked and reveal a certain amount of 
parallel prioritisation. This suggests that 
there will be enough political pressure to 
make the necessary financial resources for 
concrete projects available with the MFF 
adjustment. These projects will surely in-
clude reinforcing external-border and coastal 
protection, managing third-party agree-
ments on preventing migration, and pro-
longing the EFSI and the EU’s programmes 
for tackling youth unemployment. 
Perspectives for the post-2020 
financial framework 
In the context of this comprehensive revi-
sion of the MFF, a number of issues and 
topics are already taking shapefor the up-
coming adjustment of the next MFF post- 
2020. They will be relevant for the formal 
negotiations on a new MFF, slated to begin 
in 2018. The European Commission will 
have to submit its proposal for the post-
2020 MFF by the end of 2017. To prepare 
its MFF package, the Commission usually 
schedules a consultation phase, during 
which it incorporates demands and pro-
posals from the EU institutions and mem-
ber states as well as European civil society. 
This period of reflection on the post-2020 
MFF began with the mid-term revision. The 
Commission, EP, and several member states 
have already presented their thoughts on 
the topics to be given priority in the dis-
cussions. Seven key points are becoming 
apparent: 
(1)  Modernising the EU budget: the prior-
ities for the EU’s spending policy will, as 
usual, be at the very top of the agenda for 
the next MFF negotiations. For the net con-
tributors, this means above all aligning 
EU expenditure more closely with the prin-
ciple of European added value and clearly 
emphasising the need for greater efficiency 
and more effectiveness. Their main goal is 
to use EU funds to reach the EU’s common 
growth and employment targets and 
strengthen competitiveness. That would 
mean linking the EU budget more closely 
with the economic coordination processes 
that are running in the framework of the 
European Semester. The Commission is 
attempting to do justice to this approach by 
making budget management more perfor-
mance-orientated. By contrast with the 
net contributors, it sees a European added 
value above all in the funding programmes 
that it manages itself. The Visegrad states 
and other net beneficiaries, however, spe-
cifically reject this emphasis on centrally 
administered EU programmes; in their 
opinion, the European added value is pri-
marily to be found in the EU structural 
funds and the CAP. 
At any rate, very different contents and 
targets are associated with the expression 
of “European added value”. Over the past 
decade, the search for a common definition 
has been unsuccessful despite repeated 
attempts. The next MFF negotiating round 
will nonetheless make a renewed effort to 
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find a common reorientation of spending 
policies. 
(2)  MFF flexibility: In the past year, the 
EU has shown itself incapable of providing 
quick and comprehensive financial assis-
tance out of the EU budget to the member 
states worst hit by the migrant crisis. As 
a result, there were increasing calls for 
making the EU budget more flexible. The 
MFF negotiations will have to find a new 
relationship between the necessary ability 
to react quickly to new political challenges 
and the medium-term predictability of the 
EU budget. This can be achieved through 
additional flexibility instruments – meaning 
new funds for unforeseen tasks – as current-
ly proposed by the Commission, or through 
simplified possibilities for redesignating 
and shifting resources between expenditure 
headings (which would, however, reduce 
predictability for the member states). In any 
case, the MFF negotiations must come up 
with a solution to this problem that is ca-
pable of achieving consensus. 
(3)  The duration of the next MFF: The EP 
continues to demand that the MFF’s term 
be adjusted to match the Commission and 
Parliament political mandate periods. Its 
objective is to politicise the procedure and 
thus strengthen the MFF’s democratic le-
gitimacy. In 2011, the Commission backed 
by the EP had already suggested a 5+5-year 
term for the MFF; however, the member 
states did not follow up on the proposal. 
Every modification of the MFF term 
raises fundamental problems for reconcil-
ing it with the EU’s multiannual funding 
programmes. It is hard to predict the politi-
cal implications of a changed term. The EP, 
at least, is hoping to politically strengthen 
its negotiating position. 
To date, in its proposal the Commission 
has always staked out the frame and struc-
ture of the next MFF and laid the founda-
tions for the negotiations in the Council 
and with the EP. Since MFF negotiations 
take about two years, adjusting the MFF 
term means that it would always be the 
“old” Commission’s job to provide a budget 
for the “new” Commission. It is uncertain 
whether the successor Commission would 
feel bound by its predecessor’s political 
prioritisations. The result would presuma-
bly be to weaken the political importance 
and binding nature of the Commission’s 
draft MFF, which would be tantamount to 
weakening the Commission’s right of pro-
posal and role. 
(4)  A budget for the eurozone: Many reflec-
tions on how to develop and lastingly sta-
bilise the economic and currency union are 
increasingly linked with the MFF – especially 
the idea of creating a separate eurozone 
budget. Both the Commission and EP want 
to use the next MFF negotiations to debate 
such a separate budget. The proposal for 
a specific euro-zone budget with its own 
institutions (eurozone finance minister, 
eurozone parliament) could threaten 
the unity of the EU budget. Alongside the 
question of whether this is feasible, two 
further questions about how it could be 
done need to be answered. Would a euro-
zone budget be part of the EU MFF and 
therefore subject to EP scrutiny? And would 
the MFF ceilings apply to the eurozone 
budget as well? 
(5)  Reforming the financing system or intro-
ducing an EU tax: Before the end of 2016, a 
group of experts led by Mario Monti will 
submit its final report on reforming the 
EU own-resources system. The report is ex-
pected to discuss and make recommenda-
tions on the controversial idea of introduc-
ing an EU tax. The European Parliament’s 
and the Council’s positions are entrenched: 
the EP has been asking for years for such an 
autonomous source of resources for the EU 
budget, while a majority of member states 
forcefully reject the idea in the Council. 
What is certain, however, is that the topic 
will be on the agenda for the next MFF 
negotiating round. 
(6)  Reforming decision-making processes: MFF 
negotiations have been following the same 
pattern for over 25 years, and the results are 
usually sub-optimal and unsatisfactory. The 
European Commission, MEPs and a number 
of member states are therefore challenging 
the process for adopting the MFF. 
SWP Comments 48 
November 2016 
7 
It is under discussion whether the Coun-
cil might be able to pass the MFF regula-
tions by qualified majority decision rather 
than unanimously, which would limit the 
opportunity for member states to veto any 
compromise and thus complicate decision-
making. The European Parliament also wants 
to prune back the dominant role of the Euro-
pean Council of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, which has so far been using its own 
compromise to predetermine the position 
of the Council of Ministers in the following 
legislative process. The possibility of linking 
the annual budgets and the MFF more close-
ly, as an additional means of reforming the 
procedure, is also being discussed. 
However, the decisive question is whether 
the negotiating process can shake off the 
member states’ focus on their respective 
national net balance, which currently 
dominates everything. 
(7)  Brexit and its implications for the EU 
budget: The current financial framework is 
unlikely to be affected by the United King-
dom leaving the EU. However, negotiations 
on the next MFF will need to take into 
account the loss of this substantial net con-
tributor. In 2014, the UK was the third 
highest net contributor after Germany and 
France, with a negative net balance of 4.9 
bn euros. The financial gap created by its 
exit can be closed either by reducing spend-
ing funds or raising the payments of the 
remaining net contributors. A combination 
of both options is likely. The MFF negotia-
tions must therefore find a relationship 
between reducing expenditures and in-
creasing payments that is capable of achiev-
ing consensus. 
It is foreseeable that Germany’s negative 
net balance will continue to increase. More-
over, the net contributors’ negotiating posi-
tions, and especially the way Germany 
conducted the MFF-negotiations, have been 
significantly weakened. The UK’s hard and 
often rigorous negotiating manner offered 
Germany an opportunity of presenting its 
own negotiating targets as a compromise 
solution. This opportunity for negotiation 
tactics has now been lost. 
Inversely, the fact that the British budget 
rebate no longer applies makes it possible 
to improve the coherence of the EU budget 
system, and eliminate every rebate and other 
special rules. It is possible that the Brexit 
negotiations will not be concluded by 2019. 
In that case, the EU could conceivably 
resort to drawing up two alternative MFFs, 
one for the EU 28 and one for the EU 27. 
Conclusion 
Now that the Commission has presented its 
proposals, the mid-term MFF revision will 
become a central issue of European politics 
in the coming months. The pragmatic pro-
posals offer a realistic path towards the 
necessary adjustment of the MFF. At any 
rate, the European Parliament and the 
Council welcomed the package, seeing it 
as a good basis and starting point for the 
legislative negotiations between the two 
institutions. 
The Commission has established the 
right political priorities, which had also 
been presented by the member states in 
the Bratislava roadmap, and equipped 
them with adequate financial resources. 
Concentrating on replenishing the MFF’s 
flexibility instruments and margins also 
received widespread support among those 
involved in the negotiations. In this, the 
Commission has resisted the EP, which 
wanted to propose a marked raise of the 
MFF ceilings. It thus also refrains from 
placing further strains on the national 
budgets. However, it remains unclear 
where in the EU budget the total sum of 
about 13 bn euros of available monies, as 
calculated by the Commission, might be 
found. 
With its package of proposals on the 
mid-term MFF revision, the Commission 
has resumed its classic role of mediator 
between Council and Parliament. It is to 
be hoped that it will be also able to play 
this role in the negotiations for the new 
MFF, starting in 2018. 
It is now up to these two institutions, the 
Council and the European Parliament, to 
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ensure a swift implementation of the Com-
mission’s proposals. All those involved in 
the negotiations between the two legis-
lative bodies – and with the usual conflict 
between net contributors and net bene-
ficiaries in the circle of member states – 
should therefore seek a quick compromise, 
rather than push to have their maximum 
demands met. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2016 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-200 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Tom Genrich 
(Updated English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 61/2016) 
